

THE RAJAH
AND
PRINCIPALITY OF MYSORE:

WITH
A LETTER

TO THE
RIGHT HON. LORD STANLEY, M.P.

“Machiavel's errors arose not in consulting the principle of utility, but in making false applications of it. Bad faith is always bad policy.”

JEREMY BENTHAM.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY
THOMAS RICHARDS, 37, GREAT QUEEN STREET.
1865.

“I consider that, in fact, our Government is at the head of a system composed of native States, and I would avoid what are called rightful occasions of appropriating those territories. On the contrary, I should be disposed, as far as I could, to maintain the native States, and I am satisfied that their maintenance, and the giving to the subjects of those States the conviction that they are considered permanent parts of the general Government of India, would naturally strengthen our authority.”

LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE LORD STANLEY, M.P.,
ETC., ETC.

MY LORD,

The following statement of the claims of the Maharajah of Mysore to be reinstated in the executive government of his dominions, and to have his adopted son recognised as the lawful successor to his throne, is inscribed to your Lordship as the Minister under whose auspices Her Majesty's Proclamation of 1858 was issued to the Princes and people of India. The case is recommended to your Lordship's consideration as one which in its actual condition threatens to destroy all confidence in the sincerity of that Royal Proclamation—as one which involves the refusal of reform, and the commencement of a new series of annexations.

Your Lordship cannot fail to observe the remarkable features which, in its beginning, its progress, and its actual situation, distinguish this critical case. The administrative sequestration of the Mysore territories originated in a hasty error, which was frankly acknowledged by its responsible author, Lord William Bentinck. During the first sixteen years, the temporary and friendly object of our management was distinctly and repeatedly declared ; and no hint was given that any detriment or danger could thereby accrue to the Prince and his family, or to the Native State. It was only during the last year of Lord Dalhousie's

Viceroyalty that the promised reinstatement was absolutely dropped, and the confiscation of the Rajah's dominions at his death was for the first time suggested.

Surely the experiment of enlarging the direct possessions of the Crown in India on every available pretext and opportunity, has been tried on a sufficiently large scale, and with evil consequences to the moral and material strength of the Empire that ought to be sufficiently obvious to the world. By your Lordship those evil consequences have always been deplored and denounced ; and so far as prudence permitted, you have ever endeavoured to apply or to facilitate remedial, restorative and reassuring measures. Whatever view may be taken by us or by posterity of the merits and services of that eminent personage, there can be no doubt that the name of Lord Dalhousie will be for ever identified with the policy of annexation. He had marked down Mysore ; but the life did not happen to fall in during his tenure of office. Will your Lordship be a consenting party to the reconstruction of a systematic territorial Tontine ? Will your Lordship now assist in carrying out one deferred detail in that general scheme, which you have so often and so strenuously condemned ?

It is important above all things to impress upon your Lordship, that the Princes, and those classes of the people of India who by position and education are conscious and reflective, do not believe that their rights and interests are fairly represented, that their wishes are at all understood or respected at the seat of Empire. The Government seem to rely for intelligence solely upon official sources, and to be neither inspired with a distinct purpose nor troubled with any positive misgivings, but to be content to get through each Session of Parliament quietly, without being called upon to explain any great failure or scandal, to express any decided hope, or to declare any consistent plan for the future.

The working of British institutions is much more clearly

understood and appreciated now-a-days in India, than was the case twenty years ago. Newspapers and Blue-books are not only read by natives of English education, but are also transmitted and translated to the dependent Sovereigns, Chieftains and landlords. The names of our leading Statesmen and their avowed or supposed views on Indian subjects, are known and canvassed in the Durbar and the closet of every Native Prince.

The question of the Mysore Rajah's reinstatement and of the succession to his throne, is now a matter of the deepest and most painful anxiety throughout the Native States, as well as in the British Provinces of the Madras Presidency. It is not merely for the Prince, but for the Principality, that all are interested. In the fate of the Mysore dynasty, every Hindoo and Mussulman Chieftain will see the destiny of his own race foreshadowed. With perfect truth it may be said that the Rajah of Mysore is not a man but a system. This is not merely the grievance or the claim of a protected Sovereign, but the appeal of an Empire ; and, if it were rightly understood, it would be seen to involve the whole principle of British supremacy in India.

With the extinction of the Mysore State would disappear the last hope of order and regularity being introduced by our influence into the administration of the larger Principalities. No general scheme of policy, no political future would then remain possible for the British Empire in India, but that of continued territorial acquisitions and the progressive augmentation of the European forces. If the native States cannot be reformed, they are doomed to be gradually annexed.

There is one other peculiarity in this question, which makes it especially deserving of close attention. If it obtains a hearing in Parliament, it will offer the first opportunity that has ever been given to the Legislature of pronouncing on an Indian annexation before it has been completed,—before, in fact, it is too late. No one will be

satisfied with its summary disposal by those Parliamentary tactics, which have become familiar even to the Hindoo mind,—by a debate and a Ministerial majority. Nothing less than the calm deliberation and recorded judgment of a Committee of the House of Commons,—even though that judgment should be adverse,—will convince the Princes of India of the integrity of their rulers. The honour of the Crown is deeply compromised by a doubt being thrown on Her Majesty's royal word. In the fervent hope that your Lordship will give all the weight of your influence to secure that fair inquiry which the case demands from Parliament,

I beg to subscribe myself,

Your Lordship's faithful and obedient servant,

INDICUS.

THE RAJAH AND PRINCIPALITY OF MYSORE.

ON the 2nd August, 1858, the great Statute was passed entitled "An Act for the better government of India," whereby the Queen assumed the direct administration of her Oriental dominions. And on the 1st of the ensuing November Her Majesty's Royal Proclamation was issued by the Governor General from Allahabad, and was published on the same day, by carefully preconcerted arrangements, in every city and large station of India, with such pomp and circumstance of military and official display as local resources would permit. No lack of interest was shown by the people of the country. This was the first occasion on which the veil had been withdrawn, and the Sovereign of the British Empire had spoken face to face with her Indian Allies, feudatories and subjects; and all listened attentively. No document published by the British Government of India has ever produced so profound a sensation. Appearing in the hour of strength and triumph, when the decisive blow had been dealt to a gigantic rebellion, which had been stained by the blackest deeds of treachery and cruelty,—breathing words of peace, mercy and benevolence where vengeance and mistrust might have been expected,—this Proclamation bore upon its face the true blazon of Royalty.

But more especially, in consequence of the following unequivocal and weighty assurances, the Queen's Proclamation was enthusiastically hailed as the Magna Charta of the Minor States :—

"We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the

authority of the Honourable the East India Company, are by Us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained ; and We look for the like observance on their part. ●

“ We desire no extension of Our present territorial possessions ; and, while we will permit no aggression upon Our dominions or Our rights to be attempted with impunity, We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as Our own ; and we desire that they, as well as Our subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.”

And when Lord Canning's important despatch of the 30th April, 1860, on the right of adoption by Hindoo Princes, and Sir Charles Wood's cordial reply of the 26th July in the same year, were published, every one would have thought that the tide of greedy acquisition of territory had ebbed at last, and for ever.

But it is a painful fact that the present Governor General and the present administration at Calcutta are actually engaged in carrying on that same policy of annexation, that they are carrying it on by the discarded and discredited process of ignoring an adoption, and that this process now menaces the most friendly, the most tractable, the most orderly, and to us the most profitable native State that still exists in India. The tide of greedy acquisition ebbed for a time, but it has turned again, and, if not checked, will soon commence to sweep away in its course many of our neighbours' landmarks, and the bulwarks of our own Empire.

The policy of annexation flagged after the shock of 1857, and went out of fashion for several years, but symptoms of its revival have lately presented themselves. A decided reaction has set in ; peace and prosperity have lasted long enough to restore the national complacency, and to reinstate in the public confidence those who are officially responsible for the local management of India. The reins of government are committed to the hands of an eminent Bengal Civilian, the most active and able participator in that process of annexing provinces and resuming large estates which for a brief time had seemed to be for ever discredited and abandoned. And Sir John Lawrence lost no time in taking up the thread as Viceroy exactly where he had left it as Commissioner for the Punjab. He began very soon

by proposing a measure of tenant-right for Oude, based on a certain term of permissive occupancy, in harmony with the levelling predilections of North-West Civilians, but in violation of the pledges given to the Talookdars by Lord Canning, and calculated to undermine and deteriorate their proprietary and baronial position, which that lamented statesman had desired and promised to maintain. The alarm has been given, and confidence will not be easily restored. Rumours are abroad of designs at Calcutta for the immediate annexation of Mysore and Cashmere, and for the speedy conversion into Collectorates of that congeries of petty States in the West of India known as Kattywar.

Whatever may be the case as to some of these rumours, there can unfortunately be no doubt of the truth of those relating to Mysore. That friendly and influential native State is threatened with speedy destruction,—the native State of all others that is certain, as it always has done, to afford us invaluable material and moral support, and to relieve us of all risk and responsibility over a large area in any time of political or military danger, and which, in ordinary days of peace and tranquillity, pays handsomely for our general protection.

The threatened absorption of Mysore, on the demise of the present aged Rajah, deserves the most careful and immediate attention,—not only on account of the just grounds of remonstrance which would thereby be afforded to our ancient Ally, the Nizam,—not only with regard to the threatened rights and interests of the Rajah's family and clan,—but also as the first infringement of the general pledge in favour of the existing native sovereignties, contained in the Queen's Proclamation, and confirmed by Lord Canning's latest measures.

The case is by no means complicated or difficult of comprehension. The State of Mysore is one of our own creation. The same Prince now reigns who was raised to the throne by the Marquis Wellesley, after the fall of Tippoo Sultan in 1799.

From the subversion of the last great Hindoo State of Imperial pretensions, Beejanuggur, in 1564,* by the four Mahomedan Kings of Dowlutabad, Beejapoor, Golconda, and Beder, the Mysore Rajahs, previously feudatories of Beejanuggur, may be considered as independent Princes.

A succession of military and financial exigencies threw all the power of the State, about the year 1761, into the hands of the celebrated Hyder Ali, who always kept up the form of presenting the secluded Rajah, as their Sovereign, to the assembled people at the annual Dusserah festival, while he took the place himself of Chief Minister ; but this custom was discontinued by Tippoo, who himself assumed the title of Sultan and all the emblems of royalty, to which his father had never pretended.

During the first war with Tippoo Sultan, negotiations were carried on with the agents of Cham Raj, father of the present Rajah, which resulted in a Treaty of alliance, ratified by the Government of Madras on the 27th of November, 1782 ; in consequence of which the Hindoo Prince's flag was hoisted on the walls of Caroor, when that fort was taken, on the 2nd of April, 1783, by Colonel Lang. The conspiracy of the Rajah's adherents in Mysore, which led to these negotiations, was, however, discovered and crushed by Tippoo, and the Rajah's seclusion was then turned into a severe captivity.† In 1784 the Honourable Company made a Treaty of peace with the Sultan.

Counting from Hyder's assumption of power, to the death of Tippoo in the storm of his great stronghold, in 1799, the Mussulman ascendancy in Mysore only lasted for thirty-eight years. It was only during the last sixteen years of this period, that the old royal family was entirely superseded in the public representation of sovereignty ; and even during this season of their deepest humiliation the East India Company had, from motives of policy, respected their rights, and concluded a Treaty for their recognition.

“Between the British Government and this family,”

* Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. i, p. 76.

† *Historical Sketches of Southern India and Mysore*, by Colonel Mark Wilks, 1817, vol. ii, p. 488-500. A copy of the Treaty of 1782, for the restoration of the Hindoo dynasty of Mysore, will be found in vol. v of the Calcutta Collection of 1864, p. 183. (Longman and Co.)

writes Lord Wellesley to the Court of Directors on the 3rd of August, 1799, alluding to the ineffectual Treaty made, as described, with the present Rajah's father in 1782, "an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortunes. They had formed no connection with your enemies. Their elevation would be the spontaneous act of your generosity, and from your support alone could they ever hope to be maintained upon the throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultan, or against any other claimant."*

In the conquest of Tippoo Sultan's dominions, and in the revival of the Hindoo State of Mysore, the Honourable Company did not act alone, but in concert with the Nizam. The Nizam, besides providing and forwarding immense supplies for the British forces, had brought an army of his own into the field—including a large body of Cavalry, the arm in which we were most deficient—who received their full share of the prize-money after the storm of Seringapatam.

Two Treaties were then concluded, one, called the *Partition Treaty*, and dated 22nd June, 1799, between the East India Company and the Nizam—the other, called the *Subsidiary Treaty*, and dated the 8th July, 1799, between the East India Company and the Rajah of Mysore.

The two victorious Allies agreed to a certain division and settlement of the conquered territories ; and under the Partition Treaty, portions equal in revenue, and conveniently situated with reference to their respective frontiers, were "retained in sovereignty" by the Company and the Nizam,† while the central districts, forming a compact Principality, were allotted to the Rajah of Mysore.

In the last words of the Preamble to the Partition Treaty, it is declared that all its Articles, "by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure, and its conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties."

One of these conditions is thus stated in Article IV of the Treaty :—

"A separate Government shall be established in Mysore ; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed that the Maharajah Mysoor Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, a descendant of the

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 81-82.

† Ibid., p. 77.

ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described."

And in Article V, "the contracting parties mutually and severally agree that the districts specified in Schedule C, herunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maharajah Mysoor Kishna Rajah, and shall form *the separate Government* of Mysore, upon the conditions, hereinafter mentioned."

Lord Wellesley reserved to the Company, "as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expenses and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore."* The Rajah was to be placed in a tributary and dependent position to the British Government, in return for its military protection, and as security for the regular payment of a fixed military Subsidy, and of additional contributions in time of war.

But as if to mark by a conspicuous ceremony the concerted action and equal participation of the two Allies in restoring the ancient Hindoo sovereignty, the infant Prince was carried to the ivory throne of his ancestors, and publicly installed, by the officers of the highest rank belonging to both Governments. The circumstance is thus described by the Mysore Commissioners in their Report to the Governor-General, dated the 30th June, 1799 :—

"The ceremony of placing the Rajah on the Musnud was performed by Lieut-General Harris, as senior member of the Commission, and by Meer Allum, each of them taking a hand of his Highness on the occasion."†

Meer Allum was the Dewan or Prime Minister of Hyderabad, who had been present with the Nizam's army throughout the campaign and siege of Seringapatam, and who, as his master's Plenipotentiary, concluded and signed the Partition Treaty of 1799.

The Rajah of Mysore was recognised and instituted by the two Allies, the East India Company, and the Nizam, disposing of territories conquered by their united arms, to be the Sovereign of "a separate Government"; and he was expressly so selected as the "descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore", as the representative of a royal family whose hereditary succession had been preserved for upwards of four centuries, which had only been excluded from power,

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 77.

† Ibid., p. 736.

during the military usurpation of Hyder and Tippoo, for the comparatively short space of thirty-eight years, and which had only been excluded from the representative sovereignty for the still shorter space of sixteen years. Lord Wellesley himself, while declaring that the ancient family could assert no absolute right ; that the whole settlement must be based on the conquest by the Allies, and that "their cession must be the source of the Hindoo Prince's dominion,"* still always spoke of the Rajah's enthronement as a restoration, and alludes to "the antiquity of his legitimate title." And Lord William Bentinck, in his severe letter of the 7th September, 1831, informing the Rajah that he was about to assume the management of Mysore, thus describes what took place after the fall of Seringapatam :—

"Your Highness is well aware of the generosity displayed by the conquerors upon that occasion. Instead of availing themselves of the right of conquest, and of annexing the territories of Mysore to those of the Honourable Company and of the Nizam, the sovereignty was restored to the family of the ancient Rajahs of the country, who had taken no part in the contest, and your Highness was placed on the musnud."

The Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 is what is called by writers on public law "a Treaty of unequal alliance."

The sovereignty of the Rajah of Mysore is limited and qualified by the stipulations of the Subsidiary Treaty, under which the power of making war, and of communicating with other States is resigned, and an authoritative right of counsel is conceded to the British Government; but it is limited by nothing beyond those stipulations; and no provision is made in that Treaty for the suppression, under any circumstances, of the Rajah's sovereignty, or of that "separate Government" of Mysore constituted by the Partition Treaty with the Nizam.†

The provinces at present forming the Principality of Mysore were ceded to the Rajah, not by the East India Company alone, but—as stated in Article V of the Partition Treaty, and in Article V of the Subsidiary Treaty,—by the two allied and conquering Powers, the East India Company and the Nizam. If, therefore, by "right of conquest," the British Government has any reversionary claim upon those

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 26.

† Appendix.

provinces, the reversionary claim of the Nizam must be equally strong.

All the contemporary despatches show that Lord Wellesley fully acknowledged the equal right and interest of the Nizam in the disposal and settlement of the provinces conquered from Tippoo. The following two extracts are sufficient for our purpose :—"It is almost superfluous to state to you that the whole Kingdom of Mysore, having fallen to the arms of the Company and the Nizam, is at present to be considered as a part of their dominions." (Despatches, vol. ii, p. 13.) "The Company and the Nizam derived an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms. The right of conquest entitled the Company and the Nizam to retain the whole territory in their own hands." (Despatches, vol. ii, p. 72.)

The Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore is declared in the Preamble to be "a Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance," concluded in consequence of what was "stipulated in the Treaty of the 22nd of June, 1799" (the Partition Treaty) "between the Honourable East India Company and the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowla;"—"for effecting a settlement of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultan,"—and "in order to carry the said stipulations into effect;" and the Preamble closes with the asseveration that it "shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure."

The Partition Treaty divided the dominions ruled by Tippoo Sultan into three parts, and the Schedules attached to that Treaty define the respective acquisitions of the Honourable Company and the Nizam, and the limits of the Rajah's dominions. No Schedule is attached to the Subsidiary Treaty; the frontiers and extent of the Mysore State are not in any way indicated therein, except in the Preamble as "the territories specified in Schedule C, annexed to the said" (Partition) "Treaty," and in Article V, as "the territories ceded to him" (the Rajah,) "by the 5th Article of the Treaty of Mysore" (the Partition Treaty.) Thus, without these references to the Partition Treaty with the Nizam, the representatives of the Rajah would never have known what districts were comprised in the Mysore country. And, therefore, although the Rajah was not a party to the Partition Treaty, nor the Nizam to the Subsidiary Treaty, it is

manifest that the one cannot be read without the other ; that the two are inseparably and intentionally bound up together ; that the Rajah of Mysore is entitled to point equally to both Treaties in support of his sovereign rights.

The infant Rajah's elevation was opposed at the time by several of Lord Wellesley's advisers, and by none more than by Sir Thomas Munro, afterwards Governor of Madras, who held that we should divide between ourselves and our sole Ally, the Nizam, the whole of the conquered districts. But all objections were overruled ; the separate Government for Mysore was constituted ; Poorniah, the able Brahmin who had been Tippoo's chief officer of finance, was appointed Prime Minister, and for eleven years managed the country with great skill and success, so far as relates to the augmentation and collection of the revenue.

Poorniah was a clever financial officer, and had practised his craft in a severe school. During the last seven years of Tippoo's reign, when the Sultan obstinately insisted on keeping up enormous military establishments on a revenue reduced by Lord Cornwallis's Partition to one half of its former amount, Poorniah was driven to exercise his greatest dexterity in squeezing the unfortunate population. During his administration the pressure was never relaxed. Sir Mark Cubbon, who conducted the administration of Mysore for twenty-five years, in his official Report to Government of 1854, speaks of the immense sums "which the dubious policy of Poorniah had wrung from the people." No imputation seems ever to have been cast upon Poorniah's personal integrity, and when, in the year 1811, he was compelled to resign his authority, he left a sum of hard cash in the Treasury exceeding two millions sterling. The people did not prosper under Poorniah's rule, and little or nothing was done in the way of public improvement.

After the departure of Sir John Malcolm, the first Resident at Mysore, in 1804, Poorniah was left to pursue his own plans, in possession of undivided authority. The young Rajah was left to the enlightened tuition of his mother, his

grandmother, and the other ladies of the Harem. The patient instruction of Princes and statesmen, the tolerant reform of local institutions, seems always to have presented too narrow a field of power and patronage to be attractive to our eastern officials. This systematic negligence, in its most culpable form, characterised the dealings of the Madras Government with the pupil State committed to their charge by Lord Wellesley's arrangements.

The most striking and critical instance of this cruel neglect—that to which all the subsequent disorders must be attributed—occurred in December 1811, when, after an unavailing struggle against the Palace party, Poorniah was finally deprived of power, and the Rajah, now sixteen years old, proclaimed his own majority and took the government into his own hands. The young Prince and his personal followers were not entirely without excuse in effecting this dismissal; for the Brahmin Minister had very clearly evinced the intention of perpetually keeping his Master in luxurious seclusion, and of gaining for himself and his family, after the manner of the Peishwas at Sattara and after the recent precedents in the Mysore State, the position of hereditary Premier and actual ruler of the Kingdom.

Lord Dalhousie, in a Minute dated the 16th of January, 1856, says that the Rajah's "rule was scandalously and hopelessly bad, though he commenced it under every advantage." But what is the fact? Where ought the responsibility for the misrule of Mysore really to fall? The British Government, entitled by Article XIV of the Subsidiary Treaty to impose its authoritative advice in any matters connected with "his Highness's interests, the economy of his finances, and the happiness of his people," looked on with apparent unconcern while the Regency of its own institution was pulled to the ground; demanded no securities, imposed no authoritative advice, introduced no ordinances, but allowed a boy of sixteen to declare himself of age, and to seize upon absolute power. Yet Lord Dalhousie says that the Rajah commenced his rule "under every advantage"!

The officials of Calcutta do not hesitate, by what we can only consider a cruel abuse of rhetoric, to call the misgovernment of Mysore "a flagrant and habitual violation of the Treaty." It was never intended by the Treaty to bind down the Rajah to a course of immaculate administration,

under the penalty of immediate and perpetual suspension, and the ultimate extinction of the State in the event of failure. He was bound to accept any "regulations and ordinances" imposed by the Company; but none were imposed. He was bound by the very vague obligation of "paying the utmost attention to the advice of the Company's Government;" but he never refused to carry out any specific plan of reform; no such plan was ever laid before him. The controlling action of the British Resident and of the Madras Government was confined to desultory rebukes, and remonstrances in cases of individual grievance.

If the Rajah could really have been said to have failed to fulfil the obligations of Article XIV of the Treaty, by disregarding the advice of the Company's Government, the legitimate consequence would have been, not the total and permanent suspension of his sovereign functions, but that the Governor General would then have been justified in enforcing the obligations of that Article; in which case, as can be seen by the immediate submission of the Rajah to the still more severe measures of 1831, not the slightest obstacle or opposition would or could have been offered by the Mysore Government.

But, far from the obligations of this Article having been enforced by the East India Company, it stands on record that in the year 1814, the Resident having tendered his advice rather more strongly than usual, the Rajah, then nineteen years of age, sent a confidential agent to Madras expressly to complain of the Resident's interference; the efforts of the young Prince's emissary were successful, and the Resident was instructed by the Madras Government, in a despatch dated the 3rd July, 1814, to receive no more complaints from the subjects of Mysore, to abstain from the avowed support of those whose grievances might become known to him, and "to endeavour to guide the Rajah by advice and admonition delivered in a private and conciliatory manner." Thus, instead of the strict observance of Article XIV being enforced, its relaxation was promoted by the direct orders of the Company's Government. A signal triumph was given to the young Rajah and his corrupt advisers by the moderated instructions which they succeeded in procuring from Madras. It was naturally assumed by the evil-doers that the British Government was not very much

in earnest in its remonstrances, when it did not adopt the obvious and most easy mode for giving them full effect.

Among the distinguished officers who, under the Governor General's instructions, negotiated the treaties of 1799, there was one great man, then known as Colonel Arthur Wellesley, who with remarkable prescience foresaw all the disadvantages under which the Mysore Government would be placed from its connection with the Madras authorities. "In respect to Mysore," says he, in a letter to Major Shawe, dated 14th January, 1814, "I recommend that a gentleman from the Bengal Civil Service shall be Malcolm's successor there. The Government of that country should be placed under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor-General in Council. The Governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah than they have with the Souba of the Deccan" (the Nizam) "or the Peishwa. The consequence of the continuance of the present system will be that the Rajah's Government will be destroyed by corruption, or, if they should not be corrupt, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil, or who has strength of character or talents to defend the Government" (meaning clearly the Mysore Government) "against the second."*

In the year 1805 General Sir Arthur Wellesley had written to his brother the Marquis Wellesley in the following terms :—"I still fear the new Government of Madras, one of whose objects I believe is to overturn the existing system in Mysore, of which I have hitherto been the principal support."†

The reputation of the Madras Government for purity, and that of Indian officials in general, improved very rapidly after the Duke of Wellington's departure from India, chiefly in consequence of more stringent regulations, and of a large increase in civil salaries; but this latter reform of itself tended to enhance the value of patronage, and to stimulate the creation of new offices. The hostility to the local self-government of Mysore became even stronger than before in Madras about the year 1820, and seems to have been strangely compounded of jealousy against native pretensions and partial independence, the greed of good ap-

* Wellington's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 666.

† Ibid., vol. i, p. 432.

pointments and a strong desire to obtain the salubrious and pleasant station of Bangalore either as the permanent seat of the Madras Government, or as an occasional residence for the Governor and his Councillors. This last consideration was even urged by Lord William Bentinck upon the Court of Directors in 1834 as an argument in favour of that plan for dividing the Mysore Territories between the Rajah and the East India Company, to which our attention will shortly be called.

A few years after the Rajah assumed the direct government of his dominions, and while Poorniah's accumulations still supplied ample funds for the expenditure of the Court, the public revenue began to fall off, and serious financial difficulties began to make themselves felt; but these difficulties had their origin in other causes than the mismanagement of the native functionaries. Before the Rajah's accession,—as well under his ancestors as under Hyder and Tippoo,—Mysore was an independent and predatory State, continually enriched by contributions from the surrounding countries, while its entire resources were spent within itself. After the conquest and restoration all external tribute ceased, and the greater part of the seven lakhs of pagodas (£2,45,000) paid as Subsidy to the East India Company, was absolutely subtracted in hard cash each year from the capital of the country. During the administration of Poorniah this evil was in some degree averted by the large expenditure of the British troops stationed in Mysore. But as that force was reduced, the full extent of the change was felt. Very shortly after the Rajah's installation General Wellesley said of the Mysore administration :—"At this moment it goes on principally by the regular monthly expenditure within it."*

Another cause of distress, which about that time was felt throughout British India, arose from a fall in the price of agricultural produce, which at once caused a corresponding decline in the revenue of Mysore, where the land-tax was payable in kind; while the annual necessity of finding specie to the full extent of the Subsidy was, as General Wellesley had foreseen, a heavy drain upon the internal wealth of a State which had no external commerce.

The great financial success of Sir Mark Cubbon's administration of Mysore after 1832, was almost entirely owing to

* Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, vol. iii, p. 165.

his wise attention to improving the means of communication, whereby a constant example and increasing stimulus were given to corresponding improvements in the adjacent districts of Madras and Bombay ; and the table-land of Mysore was gradually connected with the plains and the coast. But this development of public works was an idea far in advance of the period during which the Rajah was in power, for years elapsed after the assumption of his country before a single decent road was constructed in the Madras Presidency.

In the year 1825, Sir Thomas Munro, then Governor of Madras,—able and upright, but hostile from the first and prejudiced against the native State,—visited Mysore, and warned the Rajah, that if the disorder in his affairs were not checked, the direct interference of the British Government would soon become unavoidable.

But no decisive step was taken ; no ordinances or regulations were imposed upon the Rajah ; the Governor of Madras took his leave, and the Rajah was once more left to his own devices. The result was what might have been confidently predicted. After the Rajah's triumphant success in staving off interference in 1814, it may be easily understood that he was even less amenable to advice in 1825, and that the faults of his administration had by that time become of such a nature as could not be cured by the mere repetition of remonstrances, unaccompanied by a decisive and authoritative plan of reform. Those who flattered and fleeced the young Prince considered the Governor's inaction to have conferred upon them a fresh lease and a new license. Matters went on from bad to worse.

The crisis rapidly advanced after Sir Thomas Munro's abortive visit. The vast hoards of Poorniah's administration had entirely disappeared. Funds were wanted to sustain the extravagant scale of expenditure that had become habitual ; while the revenue was actually declining, and remissions rather than exactions were urgently required.

The condition of the country gradually and steadily deteriorated ; distress and dissatisfaction began to prevail. Vague rumours of the expectant and passive hostility of the Madras Government spread over the Principality, and mainly contributed to promote the subsequent insurrection. The North-Western province of Nuggur was in open rebellion in the year 1830, and the disturbances spread to other

parts of the country. British troops promptly quelled the revolt ; but Sir Thomas Munro, who had died at his post as Governor of Madras three years before, had left on record his firm conviction that no good could come of the administration of a Prince, against whose original elevation he had protested. The strongly expressed opinion of such a man, whose views now appeared as fulfilled predictions, was irresistible, when used by his successor to support his own proposal of superseding the Rajah's authority.

Lord William Bentinck, acting on the exaggerated representations of the Madras Government, despatched to the Rajah an intimation, couched in terms of great severity, that, under the provisions of the Treaty of 1799, the British Government had determined to take into its own hands the management of Mysore. The letter, dated the 7th of September, 1831, was delivered by the British Resident. His Highness surrendered his authority without any altercation or resistance, and two British Commissioners were at once put in charge of all the departments of the State. The Governor General also appointed a Special Committee to inquire generally into the condition of Mysore. In the early part of 1834 Lord William visited Mysore, received their Report from the hands of the Committee, and had more than one interview with the Rajah.

And now Lord William Bentinck began to perceive, that the unqualified denunciations which had induced him to shelve the Rajah, were by no means corroborated by the detailed information laid before him. He perceived how little had hitherto been done on our side to instruct and guide the young ruler, and to avert the disorder in his affairs. He felt that he had been deceived and misled. He acknowledged his error ; and after his return to England, he repeatedly declared that the supersession of the Rajah of Mysore was the only incident in his Indian administration that he looked back upon with sorrow.

Immediately after receiving the Report of the Special Committee, Lord William Bentinck addressed a Despatch to the Court of Directors, proposing that he should be authorised to conclude a new Treaty, by which three districts, yielding an annual revenue equal to the permanent claims of our Government, should be ceded to the Honourable Company, and that the Rajah should be at once rein-

stated in the government of the rest of his dominions. This Despatch is dated the 14th April, 1834, and the following extracts will sufficiently explain its important bearing on the case :—

“By the adoption of the arrangement which I advocate, certain doubts will be removed which I cannot help entertaining, both as to the legality and the justice, according to a strict interpretation, of the course that has been pursued. The Treaty warrants an assumption of the country with a view to secure the payment of our Subsidy. The assumption was actually made on account of the Rajah's misgovernment. The Subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy. Again, the Treaty authorises us to assume such *part* or *parts* of the country as may be necessary to render the funds which we claim efficient and available. The whole has been assumed, although a part would unquestionably have sufficed for the purpose specified in the Treaty; and with regard to the justice of the case, I cannot but think that it would have been more fair towards the Rajah had a more distinct and positive warning been given him that the decided measure since adopted, would be put in force, if misgovernment should be found to prevail.”

“It is admitted by every one who has had an opportunity of observing the character of the Rajah, that he is in the highest degree intelligent and sensible. His disposition is described to be the reverse of tyrannical or cruel, and I can have little doubt, from the manner in which he has conducted himself in his present adverse circumstances, that he would not neglect to bring his good qualities into active operation, and to show that he had not failed to benefit by the lessons of experience. But lest this hope should be disappointed, the means ought undoubtedly to be retained in our own hands of guarding against the evil consequences of his misgovernment. The personal character of the Rajah has, I confess, materially weighed with me in recommending the measure above alluded to. I believe he will make a good ruler in future, and I am certain that, whatever may have been his past errors, he has never forgotten his obligations and his duties to the Company's government.”

The first attachment of the country by Lord William Bentinck was not justified either absolutely by the terms of the Treaty, or morally by any special urgency of outraged humanity, or of danger to the tranquillity of our own adjacent provinces. The first point,—that of the mere abstract illegality, according to the letter of the Treaty, of suspending the Rajah's authority,—appears to be proved by Lord William's own subsequent admissions that while the Treaty only warranted an assumption with a view to secure our

Subsidy, "the Subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy;" that whereas the Treaty only warranted the assumption of such "part or parts" as should be sufficient to secure the payment of our demands, we actually assumed charge of the whole country.

The truth is that the case in favour of the Rajah, and against the hasty assumption of his country, is much stronger than would appear from Lord William Bentinck's frank acknowledgment. He says that the Subsidy was not "in immediate jeopardy"; but he was not aware of the fact that it never had been in arrears for a day. His Lordship, writing to the Rajah on the 7th of September, 1831, to give formal notice of the step about to be taken, and under the influence of the highly coloured reports of the Madras Government, asserted that "the Subsidy due to the British Government had not been paid monthly according to the Treaty of 8th July, 1799." The fact is that the Subsidy had been always paid with the utmost punctuality, and that not a single instalment was due at the date of the Governor General's letter. The monthly receipts of the British authorities, carefully preserved at Mysore, testify to the unintentional inaccuracy of Lord William Bentinck's accusation,—and prove, moreover, that payments in advance to the amount of 210,648 Canteroy Pagodas (about seven lakhs of rupees, or £70,000) had actually been made, when the management of the Mysore Territories was assumed by the British Commissioners on the 18th of October, 1831.

Thus the grounds alleged for the original attachment of the country are not only unsustainable by the terms of the Treaty, but are found to be even more opposed to truth than Lord William Bentinck was ever made aware.

But we must now inquire whether any special urgency of outraged humanity, or of danger to the tranquillity of adjacent British provinces, can have morally justified the supersession of the Rajah. Lord William Bentinck, though quoting only the 4th and 5th Articles of the Treaty, and basing his intervention on their provisions, and on that apprehension for the Subsidy which he afterwards allowed to have been unfounded, proceeds in the second portion of his letter to the Rajah of the 7th September, 1831, to denounce the general mismanagement of Mysore as the exciting cause of the rebellion; declares that in the suppres-

sion of the outbreak "the greatest excesses were committed and unparalleled cruelties were inflicted by" his "Highness's officers;" and asserts that "from a regard to the obligations of the protective character which the British Government holds towards the State of Mysore," it was "imperiously called upon to supply an immediate and complete remedy, to vindicate its own character for justice," and "to interfere for the preservation of the State, and to save the various interests at stake from ruin."

And we may well concede the broadest scope to the action of the Protective Power; we may allow of its coercive intervention to check flagrant abuses and savage atrocities, even though the insecurity of the Subsidy,—the only pretext explicitly supplied by the Treaty,—should be a very distant and doubtful contingency. But the grounds of any such extraordinary intervention ought to be very solid and very sure; and it ought not to be enforced to a greater degree, nor for a greater time than necessary.

Lord William Bentinck's sweeping administrative sequestration was justified by no such conditions. The grounds of his action were not solid or sure, but fell to pieces on close inspection. The Special Committee, in their Report of the 12th December, 1833, undoubtedly condemn the Rajah's misrule, but they include in their censure the period of Poorniah's administration, and with the exception of a profuse expenditure—neither an unpopular nor an unprofitable fault for Mysore,—no new charge is brought against the Prince.

The Committee declare that the assessment all over the country had been screwed up by Poorniah to a height at which it could not have been maintained for many years longer; and that the decline of the revenue since the Minister's dismissal had not "been caused entirely by misgovernment," but was "partly attributable to causes which were beyond the control of the Rajah's administration."

The Committee also explain in their Report that the rebellion in Nuggur was not a popular rising caused by intolerable tyranny, but was chiefly the work of an ambitious pretender to a large feudal estate, aided by some of the disaffected landholders of the Provinces—whose predatory habits and separate jurisdiction had been checked and limited since the downfall of Mahratta power,—and by

the intrigues of an influential Brahmin family at Mysore, whose oppressive and corrupt practices were then under investigation, and who hoped to evade inquiry amid the turmoil of an insurrection.

And the Commissioners draw attention to the very remarkable delusion, universally prevalent at that time throughout Mysore, a firm belief that the British Government was in favour of the insurgents, and would not support the Rajah's authority. It would be impossible to account for these vague rumours, which unquestionably promoted the uprising and fostered its growth, if we did not know with what jealous and greedy eyes the Mysore administration had, from the first, been watched from Madras ; how the Rajah had been in turn neglected, encouraged to resist interference, and calumniated by the very officials who ought to have guided and protected him.

Indeed without this knowledge it would be difficult to imagine any sufficient exciting cause for the severe measures against the Rajah adopted by the Supreme Government. The mere fact of a local insurrection having broken out, does not seem to justify the immediate degradation of the Sovereign, nor does the mere fact of British troops having been employed to quell that insurrection. We were bound to employ that military force, which was amply subsidised by the Rajah, for the maintenance of his rule, and for the suppression of public disorder. A petty revolt was no surprising or unheard-of phenomenon in any part of India.

And so far from "the greatest excesses and unparalleled cruelties" having been perpetrated by his Highness's officers, it is the fact—a fact that can be proved by unimpeachable living testimony as well as by official documents,—that the greatest severities by which the suppression of the revolt was signalled, were inflicted by British officers, without the sanction or knowledge of the Rajah, and to his great horror and indignation when they were subsequently brought to his notice.

It is therefore quite clear that both the legal and the moral justification advanced by Lord William Bentinck breaks down on careful examination. It is certain, and is indeed admitted by his Lordship, that if he had known the true history and position of the case, as detailed in the

Report of the Special Committee, he would never have suspended the Rajah's authority, but would have resorted to milder measures of reform.

In March, 1835, Lord William Bentinck left India, before the answer of the Court of Directors to his proposal for the Rajah's partial restoration had arrived, and Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe succeeded provisionally to the office of Governor-General, which he held for a year. Shortly after his accession to the Government, he received a letter from the Rajah of Mysore, complaining of the long delay in settling his affairs, and in Sir Charles Metcalfe's reply, dated the 6th of April, 1835, the following passage occurs :—

“ I sincerely hope that your mind will not be kept much longer in a state of suspense, and that the decision of the Home Authorities may be conformable with your inclination.”

Lord Metcalfe decidedly favoured the re-establishment of the Hindoo Sovereign's authority ; and his deliberately recorded opinion is extant that the supersession of the Rajah of Mysore was a “ harsh and unprovoked ” measure.

Lord Auckland, when Governor-General, referring to an attempt made by the Supreme Court of Calcutta to enforce its process in Mysore, wrote as follows in a Minute in Council of July, 1840—“ The sovereignty of Mysore is exercised by the East India Company as trustees for the Rajah ; and it is contrary to their duty to commit, or to allow others to commit, any violation of the sovereignty, which might disable them from restoring it, without derogation, to the person whose sovereignty they admit.”

And, at a much later period, during the consultations on the disposal of Oude, Sir John Peter Grant, then a Member of Council, in a paper dated August the 7th, 1855, made use of the following distinction :—“ The case of Mysore differs from the supposed case of Oude, inasmuch as our management of that province is professedly temporary, and on account of the Sovereign of Mysore.”*

And again, in a despatch dated 20th April, 1858, Sir John Peter Grant, when President in Council at Calcutta, instructed the Madras Government that Mysore was “ a foreign State”, and that grants of land and title-deeds in the military cantonment of Bangalore, must be made out

* Oude Papers, 1856, p. 213.

in the name of the Rajah, and not in that of any British authority.

Lord Canning, so late as the year 1860, referring to the affairs of Mysore in the General Report on the Administration of India for the preceding official year,* thus treats the maintenance of the separate jurisdiction and distinct establishments of Mysore, as a matter of conscientious obligation :—

“It has been necessary so to conduct the administration as to fulfil *conscientiously* the instructions laid down for guidance in a letter from the Home Authorities, under date the 25th of September, 1835, and which states as follows,—‘We are desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the native usages, and not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency, when the country shall be restored to the Rajah.’”

In this letter, No. 45, dated the 25th September, 1835, in reply to Lord William Bentinck’s despatch of the 14th April, 1834, the Court of Directors distinctly declare their intention of retaining the charge of Mysore only for the specific and temporary purpose of establishing “a fair assessment upon the ryots, with security against further exaction, and a satisfactory system for the administration of justice.” They object entirely to tarnish the prospective reinstatement of a Prince who “had ever been,” as they observe, “the attached friend of the British Government,” by even that limited project of partition recommended by Lord William Bentinck. They object to the division of a State, the separate integrity of which was guaranteed by the Treaty with the Nizam. The doctrines of annexation were not yet in vogue.

But about the year 1847 new views of policy were beginning to prevail; the Mysore Commission, under the able direction of General Cubbon, had effected great improvements; the authorities, both at Calcutta and in London, began to be enamoured of their own achievements; and the lust of patronage also lured them on to tighten their grasp on Mysore.

* Published at Calcutta.

Several successive Governors-General had held out the hope to the Rajah, with more or less of sympathy and encouragement, that as soon as securities for good government had been firmly established, he should be reinstated at the head of his own administration. But in the twelve years from 1835 to 1847 the replies from Calcutta became less frequent, and latterly their tone became less pleasant and more evasive. The facts had not altered; the merits of the case had not been affected; but the times had changed. Fifteen millions sterling had been sunk in the Affghan war; the conquest of Scinde was said to have entailed a heavy burden on the finances; the Sutlej campaign had certainly cost money; an annual deficit had for many years appeared in the accounts. Distant expeditions and the advance of our external frontiers were deprecated; but the short-sighted policy of internal acquisitions began to be entertained both at Calcutta and at home. The favourite plan for restoring the financial equilibrium was that of gradually extinguishing all those native States that were in the midst of or contiguous to our territories. The Rajah had no son, and in 1847 he was in his fifty-fifth year. Mysore, the valuable field of patronage, now began to be regarded, though in a vague and furtive fashion, as Mysore the rich reversion.

In February 1848 Lord Dalhousie arrived in India to turn these vague predilections into a predetermined policy. The reign of terror for Hindoo Princes commenced. What were Lord Dalhousie's reflections on Mysore, in the full tide of annexation, may be easily conceived.

It was during Lord Dalhousie's tenure of office that a report was put in circulation that the Rajah of Mysore did not wish to adopt a son. Although never officially announced, never formally reported, this rumour was seized upon by Lord Dalhousie, and pressed into a Minute of the 16th January, 1856, in which his Lordship proposed the annexation of Mysore, "as soon as the decease of the present Rajah should come to pass." The following remarks occur in the same Minute:—

"The Rajah of Mysore is now sixty-two years of age. He is the only Rajah who, for twenty generations past, as he himself informed me, has lived to the age of sixty years. It is probable, therefore, that his life will not be much further prolonged."

This Minute was one of the legacies that Lord Dalhousie left behind him for the instruction and guidance of his successor, Lord Canning.

We have now arrived at a new stage in our downward progress. For the first time a Governor General has now recorded, although in a secret department, his desire and design to incorporate Mysore with the British dominions, on the death of the reigning Rajah. Henceforth a suspicion cannot be avoided, that the true obstacle to reinstatement is not the impossibility of securing good government, but an aversion to relax the grasp of our long continued administrative possession.

Although it may be true that expressions indicating an aversion to adopt a son at a time when his right of succession would have been assuredly rejected, may, during the darkest hours of the annexation mania, have sometimes escaped the Rajah, Lord Dalhousie's assertion in this Minute, that his Highness had "never designed to adopt an heir," is not only unsupported, but is positively contradicted by facts. From 1832 to 1860 the Rajah never, in any official document or interview, allowed any opportunity to pass away of asserting the hereditary nature of his dignity; he never expressed any doubt on the subject, and no doubt on the subject was ever expressed to him.

When Lord Canning succeeded to the Viceregal chair in 1856, the answers to the Rajah's numerous applications had all been either favourable or evasive. His claim to be restored to power had never been denied or rejected, but only postponed.

Throughout the terrible events of 1857 and 1858 the people of Mysore remained tranquil. Elements of mischief existed in abundance in various quarters; emissaries of rebellion traversed the country in every direction; but peace was never disturbed: and the Rajah's troops were actually detached into the adjoining British provinces to assist in preventing insurrection. Sir Mark Cubbon's own official statements to Government may be adduced to prove how efficacious were the example and exertions of the Rajah in securing to us the fidelity of his people.

The Viceroy acknowledged the Rajah's valuable and faithful services in a letter of thanks, dated 28th June, 1860.

From the Secretary of State he received at a later period

the honourable and gratifying assurance, by command of the Queen, that "as he was the oldest so was he known to be the staunchest of Her Majesty's Allies in India."

Early in the year 1860 the Rajah remonstrated against a plan which had been arranged by the Home Government for transferring Mysore from the immediate superintendence of the Calcutta Foreign Office to that of the Madras authorities.

The Viceroy, in his despatch to the Secretary of State on this subject, dated 30th March, 1860, declares it to be impossible to resist "an appeal coming from so venerable and loyal a Prince, and couched in terms so dignified but so respectful." And he continued thus :—

"Although no allusion is made in your despatch to the Sovereign of Mysore, it appears to me that that Prince possesses a very strong claim to have his wishes and feelings considered by us, and that we shall do that which is both ungenerous and impolitic, if we set these aside.

"It is unnecessary for me to say, that the Rajah's allusions to the loyalty of himself and his people, and to the example and aid thereby given to the native subjects of the Crown in Southern India, are quite just.

"Also, the Rajah is well entitled to point (as he does point with pride) to the actual condition of his dominions. The system of administration which has prevailed there is in many ways capable of amelioration, but it has been repeatedly acknowledged to deserve the character given to it by the Court of Directors in 1838 of a 'beneficial and improving system;' and I cannot think that the nearness of supervision, or any other convenience which would result from a transfer of the superintendence of that system to Madras, is worth purchasing at the cost of offending and alienating the Sovereign of the country; especially when, by a little patience, the desired end will, in all human probability, be attained without any such consequences."

But we now begin to perceive how Lord Dalhousie's last Minute on Mysore had operated on Lord Canning's mind. The main interest and pith of the despatch now under consideration are concentrated in the two following paragraphs :—

"The Rajah of Mysore is an old man, past sixty, and of a family notoriously shortlived. He has no son, and has adopted no heir. It has been supposed that he will bequeath his Kingdom to the British Government. I say 'supposed,' because there is no formal or official evidence of his purpose; but I know for certain that

such was his intention, because early in 1858, and whilst Upper India was still in full rebellion, the Rajah seized an opportunity of conveying to myself through an entirely private channel, not only the strongest protestations of his loyalty, gratitude and devotion to the Government, but a distinct and earnest declaration, more than once repeated, of his wish that everything he possessed should, at his death, pass into its hands."

And then :—

"I beg you to compare this declaration with the passage in his letter now enclosed, in which the Rajah expresses grave fears that the measure announced from England will interfere with the claims which he and his heirs have for the restoration of the Government of his country."

And certainly if the supposed declaration and the actual claim, be compared, they will be found to be directly contradictory. The only wonder is that this utter incompatibility of the colloquial concession with the written claim before his eyes,—a claim consistent with all the Rajah's authentic declarations before or since,—did not suggest to Lord Canning that there must have been some strange misunderstanding in 1858, some wrong interpretation of the Rajah's words, some mis-translation of an Oriental compliment.

The first result of Lord Canning's reliance on the Rajah's speedy demise and convenient testamentary dispositions, was very remarkable and very prompt, and introduced a new element into the case which has ever since tended to become of vast and indeed of exclusive importance. In one of the most weighty and interesting Despatches that ever passed between Calcutta and London,—now well known throughout India as the Adoption Despatch of 1860,*—Lord Canning strongly reprobated the caprice and mutability of our former practice with regard to regulating successions in the minor Principalities, and absolutely abandoned that pretended prerogative of rejecting adopted heirs, by which so many annexations had been effected, and to which the acquisitive school of Calcutta mainly trusted for pursuing future appropriations. But even while recommending the policy of maintaining a system of Native States, while repudiating the imaginary precedents which had been evoked for their destruction, Lord Canning—misled by the superficial temp-

* Dated from Simla, No. 43A, 30th April, 1860.

tations and supposed facilities of acquiring another rich province—sent no copy of the circular letter to the Hindoo Princes, declaring Her Majesty's intention to recognise all future adoptions, to the Rajah of Mysore, who thus, at first sight, seems to have been purposely excluded from the operation of this conservative and restorative measure.

But it must be noticed here that Lord Canning, having on the 30th of March, 1860, told the Secretary of State that the Rajah was willing to bequeath his Kingdom to the British Government, and having referred to the fact that his Highness had not adopted an heir, as a satisfactory point in the situation, could hardly be expected on the 30th of April—just one month later—to write to the Secretary of State, proposing to encourage the Rajah to adopt, and to follow that up by inviting that Prince himself to take the very step which, in Lord Canning's opinion, was so strongly to be deprecated, and which step—relying upon the Residency gossip of Lord Dalhousie's time, and upon the further instalment of the same in 1858,—Lord Canning seriously believed the Rajah did not wish to take. It must have seemed quite evident to Lord Canning that if he pressed the Rajah, he would either induce an adoption, and thus preclude the desired bequest, or he would cause the aged Sovereign's last days, in the event of his refusal to adopt, to be embittered by family dissensions, and by the general execration of his courtiers and subjects, and of all good Hindoos. The invitation to adopt was therefore not extended to the Rajah of Mysore. But there is great reason to doubt whether, in omitting to send a copy of the circular letter to the Rajah, Lord Canning, however desirous of securing the reversion of Mysore, had any hostile intention towards His Highness. He clearly believed at that time that the Rajah and himself were both of one mind on the subject.

When Lord Canning's Despatch of the 30th March, 1860, had been successful in preventing the transfer of Mysore to the Madras Presidency, the Rajah was not long kept in ignorance of its contents. It promised him relief from an immediate cause of alarm, but on grounds that were still more alarming. He was represented as the last in entail, quite willing to make a bequest of his Kingdom, from his own "free will" and "loyal attachment" to the British Go-

vernment. Somewhat encouraged, therefore, by the favourable answer given to his request, and the courteous terms in which it was conveyed, the Rajah saw that he must take the first opportunity of once more distinctly setting forth his unrevoked pretensions.

This he did in a letter to the Viceroy dated the 23rd February, 1861, in which his Highness urged that "the avowed object for which the Government of Mysore was temporarily assumed, has long since been accomplished, and there is no justifiable pretext for its further retention." After a delay of thirteen months,—on the 11th of March, 1862, the very day before that on which Lord Canning embarked for England,—a letter was sent to the Rajah which is now well known not to have been of Lord Canning's composition, though he sanctioned and signed it at the last moment, when enfeebled by illness, and glad to dispose in any way of an irritating and perplexing subject that had long pressed for settlement, and which he felt ought not to be handed over to Lord Elgin, after a year's delay, in an undetermined state. This letter gave an unfavourable reply to the Rajah's application, and for the first time since 1832 was written in an acrimonious tone. The Calcutta Secretariat could not forgive the Rajah for having so signally discomfited their confident anticipations of the forthcoming bequest of the Principality, "in free will and full sovereignty," and "in a spirit of loyal attachment," by its "venerable Sovereign,"—"more than sixty years of age, and of a family notoriously short-lived."

The Rajah then addressed a rejoinder in April 1862 to Lord Elgin; and on the sudden death of that nobleman, it fell to Sir William Denison, who as senior Governor had taken provisional charge of the Viceregal office, to communicate to His Highness the views taken by the Home Government on the question. In this letter, dated 31st December, 1863, the Rajah's claim to reinstatement is decidedly rejected—for the first time be it observed since 1832—on the ground that the Subsidiary Treaty "contains no conditions under which the administration of his Highness's possessions, if once assumed by the British Government, was to be restored to him." This is a most extraordinary argument. There are indeed no particular conditions mentioned, no peculiar formality is laid down in the Treaty

by which the restoration is to be accompanied ; but it certainly does not appear to contemplate the perpetual retention of the government, since all the provisions authorising British management, are stated to be applicable only "*so long* as any part or parts of his Highness's territories shall remain under" our "exclusive authority and control."

The execution of the two corrective Articles, IV and V, both as to commencement and as to duration, being of necessity left to the discretion of that one of the two contracting parties which alone possesses the power of enforcing the Treaty, the heaviest moral obligation was imposed upon it to be cautious as to the commencement of such an execution, and to make its duration as brief as possible. But we were *not* cautious in commencing the execution ; and we have certainly not, in any way or at any time, tried to shorten the duration of our interference. On the contrary, the administrative sequestration has been enforced to an excessive and unnecessary degree ; and although the Governor General, Lord William Bentinck, the Court of Directors, and the President of the Board of Control in 1831, Lord Glenelg, unquestionably intended it to be temporary, the grasp has been gradually tightened. Long and uninterrupted possession has produced the usual effect. The fancied power and the real patronage derived from the management, are too precious to be relinquished ; the temptation has become too much for the virtue of the Calcutta Foreign Office, until now, in his old age, the Rajah finds, from the manner in which his last urgent appeal is treated, not only that he is to remain degraded in his forced retirement, but that a private decree has been registered for the annexation of his country and the extinction of his family at his death.

The hopes entertained and expressed by two successive Governors General that the Rajah would never adopt a son, were undoubtedly based upon nothing but Residency gossip, and never ought to have been officially recorded in any more serious light. The importance attached to them is an evident proof of the absence of any fair and reasonable impediment

to the ordinary course of the Hindoo law of inheritance. But there is seldom smoke without fire ; rumours of this description are seldom quite unfounded. There really was for several years a very prevalent report, which spread a panic throughout Mysore, and for the first time in his life brought the Rajah into such personal unpopularity that he was more than once very badly received by the inhabitants of his capital,—that the Rajah had refused to adopt a son, and that at his death the Kingdom would lapse to the Honourable Company. The truth is, that in addition to that natural aversion to adopt an heir during Lord Dalhousie's career of annexation, to which we have referred, other influences were occasionally brought to bear upon his Highness which led to doubt and procrastination. An adoption being usually the selection of a successor from among the junior ranks of the family, and tending to enhance the rank and importance of a more distant branch at the expense of nearer relatives, a good deal of jealousy and opposition is frequently excited, and various devices and intrigues are sometimes employed, before the irrevocable step has been taken, to induce a postponement, in the hope that the choice may be altered. At one time the same notion was assiduously inculcated in the Rajah's mind as had been used, with a similar object, to deter the Rajah of Nagpore from concluding an adoption*—it was suggested that an heir might be used to effect his deposition, if he were to persist in demanding his reinstatement, or in any other way to be importunate and troublesome to the Commissioner.

At another period a rumour was spread abroad, and conveyed to the Rajah's ears, that some Brahmin soothsayers had positively ascertained that his own death would follow very closely, his adoption of an heir to the throne. It is highly probable that these alarming prognostications may have caused the Rajah to dislike the idea of concluding an adoption, and to defer it as long as possible, just as an Englishman may sometimes evade and defer the execution of his last will. But he never faltered in his determination, and it is creditable to his good sense and steadiness of purpose, that his Highness overcame all his misgivings, and on the 18th June, 1865, publicly adopted a son at the

* Papers relating to the Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 17.

Palace of Mysore, in the presence of a large and enthusiastic assemblage of all classes of his subjects. Major Charles Elliot, C.B., the Superintendent of the Mysore Division, specially summoned by the Rajah, was present on the occasion and witnessed the whole ceremony, and to this officer his Highness handed a letter to the Viceroy and Governor General, announcing the completion of the measure that had been so long meditated. In this letter the Rajah writes to Sir John Lawrence :—"I have this day, the 18th June, 1865, according to Hindoo law, the usage of my ancestors, and in virtue of Her Majesty's Proclamation, adopted a son as successor to all my rights under the Partition Treaty of 1799 between the East India Company and the Nizam, and under my Subsidiary Treaty of the same year with the East India Company, both of which are in full force."

The boy whom the Rajah has adopted, and who has received the name of Cham Rajyendra Wadiyar, is two and a half years of age, of the Raj-bindee or Royal blood, descended from the same stock with the Rajah, although their common ancestor can only be found in a very distant generation : he is the grandson of Gopaul Rajah Urs,* the brother of Her Highness the Ranee Luchmee, who, as Regent and guardian during the Rajah's minority, signed the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799. The young Prince was a child of the Bettada Kotay House, one of the thirteen branches of the family most nearly related to the reigning Rajah. He is now by Hindoo law the Rajah's son.

The Rajah of Mysore has now outlived by more than eleven years the family limit of sixty prescribed by the seers of Calcutta. He has also outlived the short interval which certain Brahmin astrologers predicted would separate the day of an adoption from the day of his own death. He is said to be in excellent health and spirits, determined to maintain the rights of his son and of his throne, to the last moment of his existence, and expressing the most perfect confidence in the justice of Her Majesty the Queen.

The question of the Rajah's reinstatement has thus become complicated with one of much higher and more lasting

* *Urs* is the Canarese for Prince, and the title is given to all members of the Rajah's family.

importance, that of the future destiny of the ancient Hindoo State of Mysore, of which His Highness is the reigning representative, and his adopted son the lawful heir. The question of restoring a native government during the reigning Prince's life-time, sinks into insignificance before the imminent prospect of the whole framework of the State itself being swept away at the reigning Prince's demise, and of Mysore being incorporated in the Madras Presidency. The object of His Highness's temporary suspension from power, as declared to him by Lord William Bentinck, in his letter of 7th September, 1831, viz. :—"the preservation of the State of Mysore," and "the permanent prosperity of the Raj," or dynasty, is now completely dropped by the authorities at Calcutta; and arguments are now employed to justify a persistence in the suspension, and the non-recognition of the recent adoption, which point to the subversion of the State of Mysore, and the extinction of the Raj at the decease of the present Sovereign. All those public men, therefore, who look to the maintenance of a system of protected, reformed and tributary native States as the best constitution for the British Empire in India, both as a pacifying and as an educating Power, ought to demand the restoration of the Rajah of Mysore to the functions of royalty,—not merely in submission to the faith of Treaties and the abstract justice of the claim, not merely to remove an unjust personal stigma from a friendly and faithful Prince, but as the best proof that can be given that the preservation of the Raj is still intended, and not its speedy destruction.

The Rajah having previously communicated to the Commissioner of Mysore, for the information of the Viceroy, his intention of adopting a son, a reply was sent from the Foreign Office of Calcutta, (No. 333, 29th March, 1864,) in which the following sentence occurs :—"The Rajah has a full right to adopt so far as his private property is concerned; but his Highness must be distinctly informed that no authority to adopt a successor to the Raj of Mysore has ever been given him, and that no such power can now be conceded him."

But no such concession is necessary to give legal effect to the adoption. It is true that no copy of the circular of 1860, permitting the Hindoo Princes to adopt successors,

was sent to the Rajah of Mysore ; but this arbitrary or accidental exclusion is of no disinheriting effect, by any law or custom, Asiatic or European, municipal or Imperial.

The general plan and object of Lord Canning's circular may well be applauded, as a graceful retreat from an offensive and untenable position, but there are absolutely no grounds for maintaining that the Rajah of Mysore, or any other Hindoo Sovereign, ever had, or has now, any need of the Viceroy's permission, in any form, as the preliminary or as the ratification of a fully effective adoption. We may regret that a copy of the circular was not sent to the Rajah of Mysore, but his rights, or the rights of his family, cannot be in the least diminished by that omission.

Adoption is no peculiar or exceptional privilege : it is the specific principle of the Hindoo law of inheritance. The right of adoption is that of nominating an heir in cases where *actual issue* has failed—not necessarily, or even usually, a remedy for lack of heirs, but the selection of one from a number of possible heirs, often from a long list of agnates and cognates, to be not merely *an heir* but *a son*.

The British Government has never possessed the right of disallowing adoptions for its own purposes : even where it has retained or acquired from its predecessors the prerogative of investiture over minor Principalities, it has no more right to forbid the succession of an adopted son than of a lineal male descendant. The prerogative of investiture gives jurisdiction in disputed successions, asserts supremacy, and enforces subordination, but does not justify the refusal of investiture to a lawful heir. And with respect to Hindoo Princes, with whom Treaties of perpetual friendship and alliance have been contracted, this new claim of mutilating and perverting their law of inheritance so as to corrupt the blood of all collaterals, of all cognates, and of all agnates, except the lineal male descendants of the first Prince who was induced to become our Ally, rests upon no principle of British, Hindoo, Mahomedan or international law, and is supported by no precedent and by no analogy whatever, older than Lord Dalhousie's time. This preposterous claim had its origin, and still depends for its justification, entirely upon the bold and confident assertions of certain officials at Calcutta and Bombay, without a vestige of historical, legal, or documentary proof.

Lord Canning himself, in that same Adoption Despatch of 1860, fully acknowledged that, notwithstanding all the previous assertions to the contrary, no precedent could be found for declining to recognise a succession by adoption to territorial and princely rights :—" We have not shown," he says, "so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from the Paramount Power." And he adds :—" I believe that there is no example of any Hindoo State, whether in Rajpootana or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power, by reason of that Power withholding its assent to an adoption."

Yet, by a singular series of gradations, the Mysore question has come to this unhealthy complexion at last, and if the declared intentions of the Calcutta authorities are approved and confirmed at home, the British Government will be openly committed to the violation of two Treaties, to the destruction of another friendly State, and to a direct contradiction of both the Queen's Proclamation and Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch. It is a sufficiently dangerous state of things, when the name or the memory of some particular Viceroy or Governor, living or dead, is the object of popular execration. But much more solemn sanctions are now assailed. It would be an incurable wound to British honour and influence, if the Princes and people of India should be practically taught that the word of the Queen of Great Britain, never pledged before 1858, is not to be trusted,—that Treaties are waste paper, and a Royal Proclamation merely idle words, when they stand in the way of the acquisition of more territory.

Sir Charles Wood, in his reply of the 26th of July, 1860, cordially agrees with Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch, and says :—" In the sentiments expressed in your Excellency's letter of the 30th of April I entirely concur. It is not by the extension of our Empire that its permanence is to be secured, but by the character of British rule in the territories already committed to our care, and by practically demonstrating that we are as willing to respect the rights of others as we are capable of maintaining our own."

But if the declared intentions of the present Calcutta authorities with regard to Mysore are allowed to be realised, it will be a practical demonstration that we are *not* willing

to respect the rights of others, that we are resolved to treat with contempt the rights of the Rajah of Mysore, the rights of our Ally the Nizam, the feelings and interests of the people of Mysore, and of the Princes and people of all India.

Whether we consider this Mysore case as a legal question, as a matter to be decided by a strict interpretation of covenants ; or from a moral point of view with special reference to the good of the people ; or in relation to what may be called sentimental ideas of progress ; or with sole regard to our own political and material interests,—it will equally appear, in every aspect, that the projects of the Calcutta Government are alike unjust and inexpedient.

The legal situation of the case, considered as one of abstract justice and fidelity to contracts, may be very briefly summed up. The Partition and Subsidiary Treaties of 1799, except where they are expressly modified by subsequent engagements, are still in full force.*

The Mysore Subsidy, which Lord William Bentinck admitted had “never been in jeopardy”, having been uninterruptedly paid for sixty-five years in monthly instalments according to the terms of the Treaty, no cause remains, under the strict terms of the Subsidiary Treaty, for any longer retaining the Rajah’s dominions under the “exclusive authority and control” of the British Government.

For refusing to recognise the Rajah’s adopted son and lawful successor, no honest excuse or pretext can possibly be brought forward. Such a refusal is simply a perverse reassertion of that imaginary and pretended prerogative which Lord Canning, in the Adoption Despatch of 1860, expressly and publicly rejected and abandoned.

Regarding the question again as a matter of moral obligation to the people of the country,—looking merely to the

* A new Treaty was made with the Nizam in 1800, by which the greater part of the territories acquired from Tippoo under the partitions of 1792 and 1799, were ceded to the East India Company, to provide for the Subsidiary Force; but in this, as well as in the later Treaties of 1822 and 1853, all previous engagements were expressly renewed and confirmed.

broad general case of the former misgovernment of Mysore during the Rajah's personal rule, it has been proved that the Honourable Company was primarily and mainly blameable for it. If Mysore was badly governed in the past, it was our own fault; and if Mysore were in the future to be badly governed under the restored rule of its Sovereign, the faithful Ally and attached feudatory of the British Crown, it would be equally our own fault. Ample securities can be obtained, under the provisions of the existing Treaty, for the due administration of justice, and for the economical management of the finances. No valid objection can be made, therefore, under that head to the Rajah's immediate restoration. No valid excuse can be found, under that head, for the rejection of the Rajah's heir.

Extending the power of our Government under the Treaty to the utmost limit, granting that having once assumed the management, and having retained it for thirty-four years, we are morally bound not to relinquish it until we have obtained the best security for "the welfare of the people" (one of the objects mentioned in Article V), there is no such difficulty in obtaining a full security, as can justify us in having turned the temporary interference contemplated by the Treaty into such a persistent sequestration. Still less could the British Government be justified in turning this administrative sequestration, existing professedly under the Subsidiary Treaty, into a territorial appropriation in defiance both of this Treaty and of our engagements with the Nizam.

If the great aim and object of British supremacy in India be the reform of native institutions, and the mental and moral improvement of the native races, we cannot doubt that the permanent civilisation of a people will be more advanced by the development of their capacity for self-government, than by a stereotyped system—be it ever so symmetrical and ever so benevolent—of exotic and exclusive management. In the cause of progress not less than in the cause of peace, we should plead for the maintenance of Native States, and for the elevation of Native Princes and ministers.

The political stability of our Empire and the progressive instruction of India, would equally be impaired and retarded by an unjust settlement of this Mysore question. And it is

a most extraordinary fact that Lord Canning, though misinformed and misled in this solitary instance, was fully convinced, and expressed the soundest views on the general aspect of the question. Arguing for the proposed policy of no longer interfering with the succession of adopted heirs, he says in his Despatch of the 30th April, 1860 :—

“The proposed measure will not debar the Government of India from stepping in to set right such serious abuses in a Native Government as may threaten any part of the country with anarchy or disturbance, nor from assuming *temporary charge** of a Native State when there shall be sufficient reason to do so. This has long been our practice. We have repeatedly exercised the power with the assent and sometimes at the desire of the chief authority in the State, and it is one which, used with good judgment and moderation, it is very desirable that we should retain. It will, indeed, when once the proposed assurance shall have been given, be more easy than heretofore to exercise it without provoking jealousy of any designs upon the independence of the State.”

Now most certainly the power of “assuming temporary charge of a Native State,” with the object of establishing a system of law and order, is a power which the Government of India might most beneficially hold in reserve, and employ to a much greater extent than has been hitherto attempted. But if the reformed State of Mysore were to be appropriated by the protecting Government, the power of assuming temporary charge of any other State could never be exercised without provoking jealousy and alarm to the highest possible degree.

In this most conspicuous instance of Mysore we have effectually reformed the administration of the country, but have signalised our management by the complete exclusion of the Rajah from all share in the government ; and an intention is now very plainly shown of making our administrative possession at once the opportunity and the pretext of absorbing the State and abolishing the sovereignty. If this contemplated breach of trust and violation of Treaties be allowed to proceed to the final extremity, what reliance can hereafter be placed in our moderation and good faith ?

Mysore ought to be made our model Principality. But if Mysore be annexed, if, in defiance of Her Majesty’s Proclamation, the rapacious system is to be reopened, our promises and counsels will never be believed or trusted, and any

* Our italics.

suggestion of reform, or offer of administrative assistance, will spread consternation and rouse opposition throughout every Native State.

In another part of the Adoption Despatch of 1860, Lord Canning wrote as follows :—

“It is certain that objection to the proposed measure will be taken on the ground that it will cut off future opportunities of accession of territory, and that it is our duty not to forego these.

“I regard this not as an objection, but as a recommendation ; and I cannot take that view of our duty.

“Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intention towards Native States.

“We shall not become stronger so long as we continue adding to our territory without adding to our European force ; and the additions to that force which we already require are probably as large as England can conveniently furnish, and they will certainly cost as much as India can conveniently pay.

“As to Civil Government, our English officers are too few for the work which they have on their hands, and our financial means are not yet equal to the demands upon us. Accession of territory will not make it easier to discharge our already existing duties in the administration of justice, the prosecution of public works, and in many other ways.”

The last paragraph in this extract shows that Lord Canning had become well acquainted with the immense fallacy of those hopes of augmented financial resources which had animated the advocates of annexation. He knew that the acquisition of territory had always brought with it the necessity of increased establishments, civil and military, on a more expensive scale than that which sufficed for the native government, that contented submission was turned into dangerous disaffection, and that instead of receiving tribute the Imperial Treasury was called upon to supply deficiencies. He knew that every Province absorbed by Lord Dalhousie had proved a burden on the revenues of our older possessions, and he therefore adduces the inadequacy of our “financial means” as one of the reasons for avoiding accessions of territory.

And this leads us to consider the question as it affects the material interests of Great Britain. Even by those who in a general way acknowledge the iniquity and impolicy of persistent and systematic annexation, the question of ab-

sorbing Mysore has been represented as quite special and peculiar. It has been urged, in addition to arguments drawn from the growing value and capabilities of this country, that it is so completely encircled by British provinces, that it would be highly impolitic and unadvisable to perpetuate a separate jurisdiction. It is chiefly to these considerations that Lord Canning may be supposed to have been adverting, when he wrote in the following terms to the Secretary of State for India, in that letter of 30th March, 1860, from which we have already quoted (p. 27):—

“It may be very little desirable that more provinces should be added to those which are already under the absolute rule of the Queen in India; but the case of Mysore, lying in the midst of the Madras Presidency, and already bound to us in a way which is not convenient or satisfactory, is quite exceptional; and the bequest of that country in full sovereignty to the Crown, by the free will of the ruler, and in a spirit of loyal attachment to the British power, is a consummation which, in the interest of all concerned, no one would wish to see defeated.”

If there were any weight in the considerations founded on the geographical position of Mysore in relation to our immediate possessions, it would not be difficult to show that there is nothing exceptional in that position. If the course of annexation were to be resumed in the tempting instance of Mysore, a long series of similar temptations would be reopened, and every little sovereignty, embedded in the British dominions, would feel itself to be doomed to assimilation in its turn, at the first plausible opportunity. For although the large revenue of Mysore makes it appear a more than usually desirable acquisition, there is really no special cause that can render its appropriation more defensible than that of any other State in India.

There is nothing inconvenient or unsatisfactory in the way in which Mysore is legally connected with the British Government. On the contrary, it would be much better for the Imperial Power, for the Princes and for the people, if all the Native States of India were connected with the British Crown by such well-defined ties and obligations as those of the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799. There is nothing inconvenient or unsatisfactory in the way Mysore is at present bound to us, except that obstacle to its full development as a reformed Native State, offered by the needless

and unjust suspension of its legitimate Sovereign. But when Lord Canning penned the lines which we have just quoted, in his Despatch of 30th March, 1860, he was, as we know, still under the mistaken impression that the Rajah would never adopt a son, and would actually prefer the absorption of Mysore in the British dominions to the maintenance of his hereditary throne. Without our knowledge of this erroneous belief, we should find it very difficult to account for the strange inconsistency that on the 30th March, 1860, the Governor General should deem the case of Mysore, "lying in the midst of the Madras Presidency", to be "quite exceptional", and such that its "bequest in full sovereignty to the Crown," is "a consummation which no one would wish to see defeated", while on the 30th April, 1860,—just one month later,—in his admirable Adoption Despatch, he declares that all who "remember the condition of Upper India in 1857 and 1858" must be "thankful that in the centre of the large and compact British province of Rohilcund there remained the solitary little State of Rampoor, still administered by its own Mahomedan Prince, and that on the borders of the Punjab and of the districts above Delhi, the chief of Puttiala and his kinsmen still retained their hereditary authority unimpaired."

In this Despatch Lord Canning most emphatically pronounced this maxim of Imperial policy:—

"The safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of the Native Chiefs well affected to us."

What Native Prince is more well-affected to us, what Native Prince has proved himself to be more faithfully attached to the British Crown, than the Rajah of Mysore—"that venerable and loyal Prince", as Lord Canning termed him, "the oldest and staunchest Ally of Her Majesty in India", as the Secretary of State observed, and who, again in the words of Lord Canning, "possesses a very strong claim to have his wishes and feelings consulted by us"? He does indeed possess a strong claim, although he asks for nothing but bare justice; for those who can appreciate the terrible results that must have followed, if the contagion of the revolt in Northern and Central India had spread to the Southern Presidency and the Madras Army, may well maintain, as many experienced officials have done, that not even the Nawab of Rampoor or the Rajah of Puttiala deserved so

much the gratitude of the British Government for their conduct during the rebellion, as did the Rajah of Mysore for "the ready and useful assistance which he rendered to the Queen's troops," and for his personal efforts "in preserving peace and encouraging loyalty."*

There is nothing but disgrace and loss of moral influence to be got by denying the Rajah's just claim; and every evil effect would be enormously and irretrievably increased by refusing to recognise his lawful heir. Beyond the miserable patronage, nothing whatever is really to be gained from this unjust confiscation. The Mysore State now pays a much larger sum as tribute applicable to Imperial purposes than could ever be shown as a surplus under our immediate rule, besides being bound to furnish a body of four thousand Irregular Horse, most useful troops, whenever required for our service. Altogether the direct contributions payable by Mysore, out of its revenue of one million sterling, cannot be computed at less than £300,000 per annum. No Presidency, no Collectorate in India pays so well. And the British Government is subject to no burden, is placed under no obligations in return, beyond those of general guaranty and protection. The Viceroy is not bound to station a single soldier, European or native, within the frontiers of Mysore, if he does not choose. All our troops may be withdrawn on an emergency.

We do not believe that the continued acquisition of territory can be any longer advantageous to Great Britain, or beneficial to India. However strong, however well administered, the Government of India may be, it is not, and never will be so strong, and so well administered, as to be able to trust to physical force and organised establishments, and to dispense with moral superiority. There is still immense scope for the exercise of our authoritative counsels. We would rather see one reformed native State than a dozen model Presidencies. We may want some of our seventy thousand soldiers nearer home one of these days. We should prefer the power of calling them in, on an emergency, to the privilege of being incessantly called upon to send out more Cadets, or more Competition Wallahs.

It is in the reform of the native States, and in that direction alone, that the permanent regeneration of India,

* Lord Canning to the Rajah, 28th June, 1860.

including our own immediate possessions, can be pursued. Unless we can work extensively in that direction, all our apparent progress will be superficial and ephemeral. Hitherto we seem to have aimed more at extending our boundaries than our laws and customs, more at enlarging our patronage than our moral influence. Hitherto we have seldom exerted our vast and irresistible authority in India to transmute Asiatic despotism into limited and legal monarchy. Still, enough has been done in that direction to furnish a precedent and an example; and this, good work could have been, and still can be, as well done in Mysore, as it has been in the less important State of Travancore, under the auspices of the Madras Government, and with the hearty approval of the present enlightened Rajah.

Undoubtedly much remains to be done in Travancore; but, on the whole, this Principality is decidedly more advanced than any one of those in direct subordination to the Calcutta Foreign Office; and the condition of the people, and their feelings towards the British Government, may be favourably compared with the state of affairs in the adjoining districts of the Madras Presidency.

Yet Travancore was at one time in a much worse plight than Mysore was in 1831. In the year 1808 the Subsidy had fallen into a long arrear; the Rajah, under the influence of an ambitious Dewan, defied the injunctions of the Madras Government to reduce the number of his troops, and for several months resisted in the field the military measures that were adopted for his coercion. When the Travancore army was dispersed, the Rajah was reduced to terms of submission. The expenses of the war and other penalties imposed upon the State, and the infirmities and imbecility of the Rajah, impeded a recovery from the disorders consequent on the recent insurrection. The Subsidy again fell into arrears; and in 1809, under Article V of the Treaty of 1805,* (identical with Article IV of the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore,) the management of Travancore was assumed by the British Government. For five years full authority was exercised by Colonel John Munro, the Resident; and under his judicious control the

* Collection of Treaties, 1812, p. 283; and Calcutta Collection of 1864, vol. v, p. 310.

public debts were liquidated, the revenue largely augmented, and yet by the abolition of petty cesses, the burden of taxation was much lightened. In 1814, on the accession of a young Rajah, the management of the State was restored to a native Dewan, extricated from its embarrassments, and in a condition of great prosperity. But this was under the old school of Anglo-Indian statesmanship,—nineteen years before Mysore was attached, thirty years before the policy of annexation was expounded.

Travancore pays an ample Subsidy to the Government of Madras; and both Prince and people cheerfully acknowledge how much it owes to British protection and guidance. But they certainly do not see that any benefit would accrue to them by its becoming a province of Madras. Nor would the annexation of Travancore in 1809, or at any subsequent period, have been in the least advantageous to the British Empire. Nor would any benefit or advantage be conferred, either upon the people of Mysore or upon the Imperial Government, by the annexation of that Principality. On the contrary, the change would be felt at once as injurious and offensive to all classes, and, sooner or later, it would be most damaging and burdensome to us; while the restoration of native rule—which might be brought about by a very gradual process,—would greatly redound to the honour and dignity of Great Britain, would immensely augment our moral influence, and our means of extending reform; and might almost immediately be turned to account as a relief to our military expenditure.

The question of the relative advantages to the people, and to the Imperial Power, of provincial uniformity, administered by Englishmen, and of the greatest possible development of the subordinate Native States, is not settled by proving—if it could be proved,—that any English gentleman employed as a British Governor or Commissioner must necessarily be a more wise and a more able person than a Hindoo Prince. No one but a professed Republican would think of setting up such a comparison between a European Sovereign and an eminent Statesman,—of comparing and contrasting, for instance, King Victor Emmanuel with Count Cavour, and condemning the former as an expensive superfluity. No Bengal Civilian, whether he be the “highly distinguished” offspring of Haileybury, or the

winner of untold "marks" in open competition, can ever supply—even with twenty years experience—the twenty generations of the Mysore Raj.

We want a Hindoo Prince, such as the Rajah of Mysore, not to be an accomplished administrator, not to be a profound statesman, but to be the living symbol of authority and order, the visible and avowed representative of allegiance and obedience to Her Majesty's Imperial Crown, an indispensable connecting link and medium of communication between the Teacher and the Pupil.

There cannot be a greater mistake than to set up that invidious comparison, which is so often made, between a British Commissioner and a Hindoo Sovereign. Their attributes and functions are quite distinct. With a native Prince on the throne, and in full possession of every befitting prerogative, all the influence of the British Government may be locally maintained in the person of a Resident, exercising with more or less stringency, according to time and circumstances, the right of authoritative counsel. But no British Commissioner or Governor can, on the extinction of a native Sovereignty, fill the Prince's place, exert the same influence, or wield the same moral authority. A certain moral force is destroyed, and physical force must supply the loss. The most energetic Commissioner would not undertake to govern Mysore without the constant support of British troops. More especially at any period of great national excitement—during an actual or impending invasion, or an extensive rebellion, led by a deposed Prince, a desperate pretender, or a religious fanatic,—a British Commissioner, though burdened with full responsibility, would be absolutely powerless unless backed by European soldiers.

At such a time, when a British Commissioner without adequate military support, would be a laughing-stock, a victim, or a fugitive—a Hindoo or Mahomedan Prince, unaided by our troops, with or without the countenance and advice of a Resident, in the face of much local opposition, might, by lifting up his finger, preserve the peace, not merely in his own dominions, but over a large area of adjacent British territory ; and would, to say the least, neutralise or impede a considerable part of the hostile resources, which, if unrestrained, would be arrayed against us;

Both as a conservative force and as a reforming agent throughout the Empire, the beneficial effects of a well organised and well affected Native State must ever be equally conspicuous. A British Resident, properly instructed, can bring all his representative and personal influence—either to preserve order or to promote reform—to bear upon the Sovereign and his Ministers, with whom he is in close communication, and who are connected by innumerable ties with all the great interests and centres of thought of the country, upon the most intelligent, the most deeply interested, and most influential personages in the State, upon six or eight persons who have the most to lose, and who know that they can be individually identified, and made to answer for their conduct. When these are gained the battle is won; but until they are gained, the British Instructor cannot hope to make a very deep or permanent impression upon the millions of an Indian Principality.

The Rajah's incapacity constitutes a plausible but a most untenable plea for refusing his reinstatement, but is no plea whatever for abolishing the Principality. The plea of the Prince's personal incompetence, does in effect strike at the root of hereditary monarchy, and when advanced by the British Government in India, amounts to a confession of its own incompetence as an Imperial and Paramount Power.

What Prince in the world is endowed with sufficient talents, or with sufficient self-denial, to be safely trusted with absolute power? Was the youthful King George selected to rule over Greece on account of his extraordinary administrative abilities? Is he trusted, ought he ever to be trusted, with the power of administering justice, and disposing of the public revenues, according to his own notions and predilections, unchecked by Law, uncontrolled by constitutional advisers. But the Rajah of Mysore, according to Calcutta doctrines, was bound to have been a benevolent and enlightened despot at the age of sixteen, and, failing that, was properly reduced to be a pensioner for life, and the last Prince of his family. And yet we may surely assume that the Rajah never was really incompetent for the duties of a limited Monarch, when we find that Lord William Bentinck, after a careful inquiry, pronounced him to be "in the highest degree intelligent and sensible," described his disposition as "the reverse of tyrannical or cruel," and

expressed his belief that he would "make a good ruler in future."

In some of the official documents issued from the Calcutta Foreign Office, it has been said that the Rajah was never led to expect that his authority would be restored, "under its former conditions." The Rajah has never asked to be replaced at the head of affairs under the former conditions of uncontrolled and lawless power. On the contrary, he has repeatedly invited the imposition of regulations and ordinances; he has often in his correspondence with our Government, alluded to "salutary regulations" that might have been imposed upon him, and which he was "bound by the Treaty to regard." Ample power is conferred upon the British Government by the Treaty, to introduce "regulations and ordinances," and to offer authoritative advice on all subjects "connected with his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both States." It is hard to understand why our Government should not have introduced the first essentials of a limited monarchy, such as a Code, a Civil List, and a Council of State, instead of making use of the Rajah's alleged incapacity and profusion as a pretext for destroying the Principality.

The alleged incapacity of the Rajah is not only an antiquated and retrogressive objection, but it is a most unfair and unfounded imputation. Lord William Bentinck's opinion of his Highness's character has been already cited. The Rajah of Mysore, if left to his own unassisted devices, might not be found to be a very profound statesman, or a very skilful administrator; but, even setting aside the powers of guidance and control retained by our Government under the terms of the existing Treaty, the Rajah knows well where to look for good advisers, and there would be no danger of his promoting any great alterations in that system, towards which, as General Sir Mark Cubbon reported in a despatch of the 2nd June, 1860, "the greatest cordiality has been observed by his Highness for a good many years." The Rajah has never shut his eyes to the errors of his youth; he has not been unmindful of the benefits conferred upon the country by General Cubbon's long administration, and by the existing system of European superintendence. Hope deferred may have made his heart sick, but it has never

turned him from the firm attachment to British supremacy and reliance on British protection, which was the first lesson of his childhood, and has been the guiding principle of his public life. The Rajah of Mysore is, in fact, a Prince of more than average acuteness of intellect, active for his years, and capable of taking a shrewd and lively share in a discussion on public affairs; master of three languages spoken in his dominions, Canarese, Mahratta, and Hindustanee; sufficiently acquainted with English to appreciate and control a correspondence, and to understand a good deal of a conversation, though unable or unwilling to take part in it. At his advanced age, and with his severe experience, there could not be a better instrument in our hands than the present Rajah,—there could not be a Prince more admirably adapted for our Imperial purposes, both as a conservative power and as a visible agent for accepting and assimilating reforms. His disposition is acknowledged to be humane and beneficent; and, apart from the general respect for his lineage and station, the popular love and regard for the Rajah's person and dignity, always very remarkable throughout Mysore, have been much heightened of late years, in the midst of conflicting rumours as to the restoration of his authority, and with the ever approaching prospect of losing him altogether. With the government of a hundred and fifty millions in our hands, with seventy thousand British soldiers locked up in India, we are as little able to afford, we ought to be as unwilling, to lose the Rajah, as are the people of Mysore. But if we lose him or his family by annexation, we shall lose many other native Princes, and millions of native hearts, by alienation. If we regain him, or even his successor, by restoration, we shall redouble our moral influence, we shall redouble our reforming capacity, we shall be able to take the first steps for relieving our military strength.

The local governors of India,—the leading members of the Bengal Civil Service,—have taken no such steps, and they never will do so without instructions and orders from home. They are professional administrators, and they are English gentlemen among subservient Hindoos. The greed of patronage, the arrogance of race, the pedantry of office, all the evil influences of their position and training, prejudice them against the extension or restoration of native

rule, and make it impossible that they should judge such a question impartially. Even their highest aspirations for the good of the people are perverted to injustice by their professional habits and predilections. Annexation, not reform or instruction, is their political panacea for India. They have devised no plan for improving a dependent State, except that of destruction. They are prepared to take that course with the Mysore State, and they most assuredly will do so, if they are not checked by the Government of Great Britain. They have even had the extraordinary imprudence to urge upon the Rajah very recently, in reply to his unanswerable claims, that during the last thirty years "great changes have taken place, and new interests have grown up"; as if it could be maintained with dignity or with decency, that as new interests arise, Treaties may be disregarded. The Rajah of Mysore is in his seventy-second year, and it will be too late to interfere, too late to remonstrate, when he is no more—when the Calcutta professionals have committed the British Government beyond retreat by a proclamation, by preferring supposed new interests to undeniable ancient rights, by openly rejecting the Rajah's heir, by intimidating the Nizam into silence, perhaps by some "just and necessary" measures of coercion and correction.

It will then be too late to reconsider either the justice or the policy of extinguishing the Mysore Principality. The question must be decided in England, and must be decided without delay.

APPENDIX.

ALL the conditions which were imposed upon the Rajah of Mysore by the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, slightly modified by the additional Articles of 1807, may be concisely stated as follows :—He was to receive a military force furnished by the East India Company, for the defence and security of his dominions, and to pay the annual sum of seven lakhs of star pagodas (£245,000) as a Subsidy* (Article II) ; he was to maintain at all times fit for service, and ready to serve with the Company's army, a body of 4,000 effective Horse (Additional Article I) ; to hold no communication or correspondence with any foreign State (Article VI) ; to admit no European into his service, or into his territories, without the consent of the Company (Article VII) ; to make a suitable provision for certain officers of rank in the service of Tippoo Sultan (Article XI) : and Article XIV contains a declaration on behalf of the Rajah that he will “pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interest, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both States.”

The two corrective Articles, IV and V, under which Lord William Bentinck professed to act in assuming charge of the Rajah's dominions in 1831, are here given at full length.

* In addition to this, the Rajah, by a subsequent arrangement, pays £5,000 per annum, as *rent* for the river island of Seringapatam, held in sovereignty by the British Government, making £250,000 per annum in all.

“Art. IV. And whereas it is indispensably necessary that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the fund destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the 3rd Article of the present Treaty, it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor General in Council at Fort William in Bengal, shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor General in Council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right, either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the Government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the Servants of the said Company Bahadour, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of His Highness Maharaja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadour as shall appear to him the said Governor General in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available in time of peace or war.”

“Art. V. And it is hereby further agreed that whenever the said Governor General in Council shall signify to the said Maharaja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadour that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the 4th Article, His said Highness Maharaja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadour shall immediately issue orders to his Amils or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances according to the tenor of the 4th Article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and control of the English Company Bahadour, and in case His Highness shall not issue such orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor General in Council shall be at liberty to issue orders by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge most expedient for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said Military Fund, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country and the welfare of the people. Provided always that whenever and so long as any part or parts of His said Highness's

territories shall be placed and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the East India Company, the Governor General in Council shall render to His Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the Territories so assumed; provided also, that in no case whatever shall His Highness's actual receipt, or annual income arising out of his territorial revenue, be less than one lakh of Star Pagodas, together with one-fifth of the net revenue of the whole of the Territories ceded to him by the 5th Article of the Treaty of Mysore, which sum of one lakh of Star Pagodas, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said net revenues, the East India Company engages, in all times and in every possible case, to secure and cause to be paid for His Highness's use."

The Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 with the Rajah of Mysore, and the Additional Articles of 1807, will be found in the Collection of Treaties, printed in London for the East India Company in 1812, pp. 441-459, and 302-304; and also in vol. v of the Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 1864 (Longman and Co., London), pp. 158-169.

The Partition Treaty of 1799 with the Nizam, will be found in the Volume of Treaties, Parliamentary Return to the Lords, 1853, p. 138: and also in vol. v of the above-mentioned Calcutta Collection of 1864, p. 55.

Much additional information on the Mysore question, and many of the documents *in extenso* to which reference is made in the preceding brief statement, will be found in "The Mysore Reversion", by Major Evans Bell, published by Trübner and Co., Paternoster Row, 1865.

